Israel claims neutrality in the Syrian Civil War, but it has targeted the Syrian army and its allies in the past. Directed by Samuel Maoz. With Yoav Donat, Itay Tiran, Oshri Cohen, Michael Moshonov. During the First Lebanon War in 1982, a lone tank and a paratroopers platoon are. News; World; Middle East; Israeli defence minister: Next war with Hamas will be the last because Terrorism and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict. Dr. Slater is professor emeritus of political science and a university research scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Is terrorism — commonly understood to mean deliberate attacks on innocent civilians — ever justifiable, or at least subject to morally persuasive distinctions? I will argue that while terrorism is always morally wrong, it is both possible and desirable to distinguish between degrees of moral wrongness. I will examine this issue in the context of just- war moral theory and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Is terrorism — commonly understood to mean deliberate attacks on innocent civilians — ever justifiable, or at least subject to morally persuasive distinctions? The Killing Zone Military and War - 52 min - . The Alpha Diaries Military and War. David & Fatima is basically Romeo & Juliet, but with a Jew and a Muslim. David, the handsome Israeli Jew, falls in love with Fatima, the beautiful Palestinian Muslim. Documentary recreating Israeli interrogations wins Berlin film award Palestinian director Raed Andoni’s movie Both Israel and the Palestinians have resorted to terrorism at various times during the course of their long conflict. After a broad overview of this history of mutual terrorism, I will discuss the conduct of both parties in terms drawn from the just- war tradition. These are (1) just cause, (2) last resort or the availability of alternatives to terrorism to reach a just cause, and (3) the probability that terrorism will realize a just cause. My central argument is that, contrary to the standard mythology, especially in Israel, Israeli terrorism has been significantly worse than that of the Palestinians. A refutation of this mythology is important for a number of reasons. First, of course, ascertaining historical truth is important for its own sake. Second, the truth might make Israelis less blind to their own behavior and therefore less intransigent in seeking a compromise settlement of their conflict with the Palestinians. In particular, the truth should make it clear that Israel has neither the moral legitimacy nor the national interest to refuse to negotiate with Palestinian organizations that have employed terrorism, particularly Hamas, without whose participation there is no chance for a compromise settlement of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Third, because the Israeli mythology is also widely accepted in the United States, the truth might — or, at least, should — lead the American Jewish community (of which I am a part) to rethink its views and therefore, in turn, make it politically feasible for the U. S. Finally, a refutation of the mythology should serve the principles not only of truth but also of justice: current U. S. It is often argued that terrorism is very difficult to define and objectively identify because the matter is hopelessly confused by semantic or ideological issues: . There is a generally accepted and objective definition of terrorism (though with minor variations): deliberate attacks, whether by governments or non- governmental groups, on noncombatants (sometimes described as . Moreover, it is unhelpful to moral analyses as well as policy prescriptions if the definition of terrorism is confined to mean actions that only nonstate actors engage in. Not in terms of categorical morality, which holds that certain rules or principles are inviolate, regardless of the circumstances; for example, Catholic moral tradition holds that evil may never be done in order that good can come of it. With regard to terrorism, then, categorical morality prohibits any deliberate attacks on innocent civilians (noncombatants), even if employed on behalf of a just cause, and even if no other means are available to realize it. By contrast, consequentialist morality holds that, in the final analysis, actions and behavior can only be judged in terms of their practical consequences. In some circumstances, this view holds, the consequences of terrorism might be morally preferable to a status quo that cannot be changed except by terrorism. Most writers on terrorism, certainly most Western political leaders, claim to categorically oppose it, regardless of consequences. That is clearly not the case, however, for hypocrisy or simple moral blindness have often trumped a categorical rejection of terrorism. For example, during the Cold War the United States actively supported Latin American military dictatorships that routinely tortured and murdered thousands of their own people in the name of . At the very least, in general discourse, it is often held that some forms of terrorism are more . Thus, it seems fair to conclude that in ordinary judgments, few people truly believe that all forms of terrorism are equally and always prohibited. In real life, then, as distinct from moral theory, we make distinctions and consider mitigating circumstances: causes, contexts, exceptions and consequences are typically taken into account and inform our final moral judgments about terrorism. The most common distinction is between terrorism on behalf of what we think of as a just cause and that on behalf of an unjust one. Aside from governments and ordinary citizens, a number of consequentialist moral philosophers have also questioned whether all terrorism can be categorically rejected, especially in cases of extreme injustices in which all other measures of remediation have failed. As well, it is commonly observed that an absolute prohibition against terrorism favors the militarily strong, an obvious issue in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, examined below. For this and other reasons, as C. A. J. They would test the prohibition as expressing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism. On the one hand, deliberate attacks on noncombatants are a clear moral evil. On the other, we instinctively wish to make distinctions between lesser and greater evils or unmitigated and mitigated evils. Just- War Theory and Terrorism. For those who cannot accept a truly categorical moral prohibition of terrorism, just- war theory points to a number of morally relevant distinctions. Just Cause. The first distinction is between terrorism whose purpose is morally indefensible and that whose purpose is justified. But what constitutes a just cause, one that is ? It is a matter of argument and judgment. That said, in both international law and common morality, some causes are clearly so just they may warrant the use of force to attain them. The almost universally accepted justification is that of self- defense. Beyond that, there is an increasing acceptance of the principle that force may be justified to protect human- rights from massive abuse. In this light, the principal just- cause argument I am making here is that, in the context of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians have the right (just cause) to freedom, independence, and an end to Israeli occupation and repression. However, while a just cause is an obviously necessary condition if violence in general — and terrorism in particular — can ever be considered justifiable or, at least, mitigable, it is by no means sufficient; in just- war moral philosophy, further conditions must be met. Last Resort, or Absence of Alternatives. Terrorism, it is often said, is a weapon of the weak. The strong (such as states) have alternatives that the weak (such as nonstate groups and movements) lack: diplomatic and political influence, economic incentives and disincentives, and powerful armed forces. State attacks on noncombatants, therefore, even assuming a just cause, have an even greater burden of moral proof than nonstate attacks. Nonetheless, terrorism by the weak, even on behalf of a just cause (the end of oppression, national liberation), could never be regarded as justifiable unless it was clear that all other means had failed. These means must include negotiations for a political settlement and nonviolent resistance if political means fail. They may even include armed resistance, but only so long as it is directed not against the civilian population but only against the oppressor's military forces or other instruments of violent repression. A Reasonable Probability of Success. Even if the morally required conditions of just cause and absence of alternatives are met, any consequentialist justification for terrorism must also show that terrorism can lead to the realization of a just cause. In that sense, does terrorism ever work? There is a considerable body of scholarly literature on this issue, but no consensus on the answer. Some conclude that terrorism only hardens resistance; others argue that it has sometimes resulted in the realization of a just cause after other methods have failed. The historical record suggests that the latter argument is the more persuasive. Terrorism employed by nationalist movements, such as for ending colonialism or other forms of foreign oppression, has sometimes achieved its goal or at least been a major contributing factor. Among the examples often cited to support that conclusion are the Algerian independence movement of the 1. ANC terrorism against South African apartheid, the defeat of British colonialism in Kenya and white settler colonial rule in Rhodesia, and the oft- cited success of Zionist terrorism in the creation of the state of Israel. Even so, the more important question, at least in moral terms, is whether even successful terrorism in a just cause can be morally justified. THE ISRAELI- PALESTINIAN CONFLICTPalestinian Terrorism. Israel typically labels acts of Palestinian armed resistance, including against its occupying military forces, as . As Igor Primoratz, a prominent Israeli writer on terrorism, has pointed out, although there were Palestinian riots and mob violence in the 1. Israeli civilian targets (such as buses and restaurants) and against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad (the Munich Olympic team, air traffic and others). Even then, most historians of this period argue that the primary practical purpose of the terrorism (despite some of the extremist Palestinian rhetoric) was less that of destroying the Israeli state — which it obviously had no chance of doing — than calling the world's attention to the Palestinian plight. That is not to say that it was justified. Nonetheless, even in its earlier stages, the operational goal of most Palestinian terrorism was a limited one. In any case, beginning in the 1. This Israeli special forces unit is their version of Navy SEALs. One of the most secretive units in the whole of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Shayetet 1. Israel’s special operations forces. Navy SEALs, Shayetet 1. S1. 3 for short) specializes in counter- terrorism, sabotage, intelligence gathering, hostage rescue and boarding ships at sea. Unlike other units in the IDF, whose mandatory service requirements are the same 3. Israeli citizen, S1. The unit is almost as old as the modern state of Israel itself. It was founded by naval forces from the Haganah, the Jewish paramilitary organization under the British Mandate of Palestine, which would later become the modern day IDF. Like the U. S. Navy SEALs, the elite S1. Once they got going, however, they became the fighting force they were always meant to be. In a joint operation with Sayeret Matkal (think IDF Delta Force), the Israelis took out an Egyptian early warning radar system on Green Island, a base at the mouth of the Suez Canal, just to remind the Egyptian military that no one was safe from Israel. During the War of Attrition, a yearlong series of artillery shelling, commando raids, and aerial combat between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, Shayetet 1. Egypt, destroyed training bases and units in Lebanon, as well as bases in Syria. During Operation Wrath of God, the Israeli retaliation against terrorists who killed Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1. S1. 3 raided the Lebanese capital of Beirut. Called Operation Spring of Youth, this raid is depicted in the 2. Munich. During the 1. Yom Kippur War, S1. Lebanon and sunk many Egyptian ships in port during raids there. During the 1. 98. Israel- Lebanon War, they created beachheads for Israeli armor, captured high- value targets, and decimated Hezbollah fighter units. The unit isn’t without controversy. They are the unit who raided the Mavi Marmara relief flotilla bound for Gaza from Turkey. The commando claimed they came under attack from activists who were armed, but the activists maintain there were no arms on board. Nine of the Mavi Marmara’s people were killed in the incident. The training for S1. A six- month basic training and advanced infantry training phase follows before three months of advanced infantry and weapons training, parachute training, maritime warfare, boat operations, forced marches, and demolitions. The next phase includes combat diving and operating in high- risk environments. All this leads to a yearlong phase of complete immersive training and counter- terrorism. Trainees raid oil rigs, ships, and coastal structures. They are then divided into three specialized unites based on their interests and skills. More from We. Are. The. Mighty. com: This video shows that the King Stallion is an absolute beast of a helicopter. A sailor snuck “Remember Pearl Harbor” onto Tojo’s dentures before his war crime trial.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
August 2017
Categories |